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10 Potential Vulnerability Classes in AcmeDesk Electron App

  1. Auto-login token storage
    • Where to look: %APPDATA%\AcmeDesk\data.db, settings.json or profile.db.
    • Risk: Token theft via file access.
    • Check: Get-ChildItem -Path $env:APPDATA\AcmeDesk\data.db | Select FullName,LastWriteTime.
    • PoC: Modify data.db to inject fake credentials (test with dummy values).
    • Fix: Encrypt tokens using Windows DPAPI or AES keys.
  2. SQLite database in user-writable location
    • Where to look: %APPDATA%\AcmeDesk\data.db schema.
    • Risk: SQL injection via malicious backup files.
    • Check: Use sqlite3 CLI to dump tables: sqlite3.exe data.db ".dump".
    • PoC: Inject SQL syntax into a test backup file (e.g., UNION SELECT).
    • Fix: Validate input in SQLite queries and use parameterized statements.
  3. Custom protocol handler (acmedesk://)
    • Where to look: main.js, app.asar for URL parsing logic.
    • Risk: Arbitrary command execution via crafted URLs.
    • Check: Test with acmedesk://open?path=malicious.txt.
    • PoC: Create a file named cmd.exe in app directory; trigger via URL.
    • Fix: Sanitize URL parameters and use shell.openExternal cautiously.
  4. Auto-update via PowerShell
    • Where to look: update.ps1, latest.yml content.
    • Risk: Privilege escalation via malicious scripts.
    • Check: Get-Content C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\update.ps1.
    • PoC: Replace update.ps1 with a script that runs whoami.
    • Fix: Sign update scripts and validate hashes.
  5. ZIP import from user-controlled backups
    • Where to look: attachments/ directory, extraction logic.
    • Risk: Malicious files disguised as backups.
    • Check: Scan ZIP contents with Get-ChildItem -Path.\attachments\*.zip | ForEach-Object { Expand-Archive $_.FullName }.
    • PoC: Embed a malicious.exe in a ZIP; trigger import.
    • Fix: Whitelist allowed file extensions and scan archives with ClamAV.
  6. Electron-specific vulnerabilities
    • Where to look: nodeIntegration in main.js, IPC channels.
    • Risk: Node.js injection via renderer processes.
    • Check: Get-Process | Where { $_.Path -like "*electron.exe" }.
    • PoC: Inject Node.js code into a renderer process (requires reverse engineering).
    • Fix: Disable nodeIntegration and use sandboxed renderers.
  7. Insecure handling of user input
    • Where to look: URL parameters, file names in attachments/.
    • Risk: Path traversal or command injection.
    • Check: Test with acmedesk://open?path=../../../../Windows/System32/cmd.exe.
    • PoC: Access restricted files via crafted URLs.
    • Fix: Validate paths against allowlists and escape special characters.
  8. Missing integrity checks
    • Where to look: latest.yml, update scripts.
    • Risk: Tampered updates bypassing verification.
    • Check: Compare latest.yml hash with expected value (e.g., 0x12345678).
    • PoC: Modify latest.yml to point to a malicious update URL.
    • Fix: Use SHA-256 hashes and digital signatures for updates.
  9. Insecure temporary files
    • Where to look: C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp permissions.
    • Risk: Malicious files planted via temp directory.
    • Check: Get-ChildItem -Path $env:Temp | Where { $_.Name -like "*update*" }.
    • PoC: Create a malicious update.ps1 in temp and trigger auto-update.
    • Fix: Use restricted temporary folders (e.g., C:\Windows\Temp) with ACLs.
  10. Privilege escalation
    • Where to look: app.asar bundled binaries, UAC prompts.
    • Risk: App runs with elevated privileges (e.g., admin rights).
    • Check: Get-Process | Where { $_.Path -like "*electron.exe" } | Format-Table ProcessName,User.
    • PoC: Run whoami /priv via a malicious update.
    • Fix: Drop privileges using runas or AppLocker policies.

Custom Protocol Handler Checklist

  1. Handler registration: Verify HKCU:\Software\Classes\acmedesk exists.
  2. URL parsing: Test acmedesk://open?path=malicious.txt → check file creation.
  3. Command execution: Test acmedesk://open?path=cmd.exe → check for process.
  4. File access control: Ensure app only accesses attachments/ via handler (no direct file access).
  5. Handler permissions: Check registry ACLs for HKCU:\Software\Classes\acmedesk.

Safe PowerShell Artifact Collection Script

# Collect files, permissions, hashes, and versions without network access
$artifacts = @()

# Files in %APPDATA%\AcmeDesk and attachments/
$acmedeskDir = "$env:APPDATA\AcmeDesk"
$attachmentsDir = Join-Path $acmedeskDir "attachments"

$artifacts += Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Path $acmedeskDir | 
              ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ 
                  Path = $_.FullName; 
                  LastModified = $_.LastWriteTime; 
                  Size = $_.Length 
              } }

# Permissions
$artifacts += Get-Acl -Path $acmedeskDir | 
              ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ 
                  Path = $_.Path; 
                  Owner = $_.Owner; 
                  AccessRules = ($_.Access | ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ 
                      Identity = $_.IdentityReference; 
                      AccessType = $_.AccessControlType; 
                  } }) 
              } }

# Hashes (MD5/SHA256)
$artifacts += Get-ChildItem -Path $acmedeskDir | 
              ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ 
                  Path = $_.FullName; 
                  MD5 = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm MD5).Hash; 
                  SHA256 = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256).Hash 
              } }

# Binary versions
$artifacts += Get-FileVersion -Path $acmedeskDir\*.exe

# Write to a local file
$artifacts | Export-Csv -Path "C:\AcmeDesk_Artifacts.csv" -NoTypeInformation

Most Probable & Critical Issues

  1. Most probable:
    • Auto-login token theft (highly likely in %APPDATA%\AcmeDesk\data.db).
    • Insecure acmedesk:// handler (common in Electron apps).
  2. Critical:
    • Arbitrary code execution via auto-update (update.ps1).
    • Privilege escalation if app runs as admin.
  3. Cannot confirm without binary access:
    • Exact update.ps1 content (could be benign or malicious).
    • Internal logic of the protocol handler.

Limitations: Without binary access, I cannot confirm exploit details (e.g., update.ps1 content, handler logic). Focus on observable behaviors and file system artifacts.

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